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We theorize the membership, target-selection, and timing of transnational advocacy campaigns as a 
function of longstanding professional networks between NGOs and individual professional 
campaigners. Unlike previous scholarship that focuses on the role of powerful “gatekeeper” NGOs 
whose central position within transnational issue-networks allows them to promote or block specific 
issues at will, we draw on recent work in sociology and organizational studies to bring into focus a wider 
community of individuals and organizations whose competition for professional growth and “issue-
control” (Henriksen and Seabrooke 2016) shape the transnational advocacy agenda. In doing so we 
elaborate and qualify existing notions of gatekeeping pioneered by Bob (2005, 2010) and Carpenter 
(2011, 2014). Highly connected and resource-rich NGOs are often less able to “set” or “vet” agendas 
than previous scholarship suggests. Instead, porous organizational borders and “revolving doors” imply 
that advocacy agendas are shaped by professional networks that develop between organizations. Efforts 
by individual professional staff to steer the agenda towards issues that fit their personal expertise and 
career ambitions—rather than wider political context or longstanding organizational commitments to 
specific issues—play a crucial role in transnational agenda-setting. 
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On 23 April 2013, a human shaped “friendly” robot strolled across Parliament Square in Westminster, 
handing out bumper stickers with the slogan #bankillerrobots.1 The event marked the launch of the 
International Campaign to Ban Killer Robots (ICSKR). The ICSKR is the latest in a series of high-
profile transnational advocacy campaigns launched since 1992 with the aim of pressuring states to 
outlaw different weapons; from anti-personal landmines and cluster bombs, to small arms, blinding 
lasers, depleted uranium munitions, nuclear weapons, and the use of explosives in populated areas. 
Whilst they have varied in success, these campaigns have all involved a similar cast of actors and 
adopted similar methods of advocacy. 
We seek to explain the membership, target-selection, and timing of transnational advocacy 
campaigns as a function of long-established professional networks between NGOs and individual 
campaigners. Existing international relations (IR) scholarship highlights several factors that guide the 
selection of campaign targets. Some explanations focus on intrinsic attributes of issues. For example, 
scholars have argued that transnational advocates are likely to focus on issues that involve direct harm 
to vulnerable groups, or that can be summarized as a simple, one-line message apt for mobilizing public 
opinion (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 27; Khagram et al. 2002; Price 2003; Tarrow 2005; Carpenter 2014). 
Others emphasize contextual aspects of the wider political environment, such as the “political salience” 
of an issue (Tarrow 2005; Betsill and Correll 2008; Carpenter 2014; Garcia 2015), or the availability of 
extant norms and practices to which an issue can be linked (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Price 2003, 596). 
A third line of argument focuses on opportunities for strategic partnerships between NGOs and “middle-
power” states that facilitate access to international negotiation fora (Bower 2016, Rutherford and 
Matthew 2003; Bolton and Nash 2010; Garcia 2015), while a fourth stresses structural relationships 
between advocacy groups, highlighting the disproportionate role of powerful “gatekeeper” NGOs in 
shaping the transnational advocacy agenda (Bob 2005, 2010; Carpenter 2011, 2014; Carpenter et al. 
2014). As regards campaign timing, most extant theories stress some notion of “political ripeness” 
triggered by the advent of high-profile political deliberations or by dramatic events such as war or famine 
(e.g., opcit). 
Seen against this extant scholarship, the ICSKR presents a puzzle. Unlike anti-personal landmines 
that have been in use for centuries, or cluster munitions which have claimed tens of thousands of civilian 
lives since the 1990s,2 “killer robots” (or Lethal Autonomous Weapons, LAWS) have yet to be fully 
developed or used. Thus, there is no readily identifiable group of vulnerable victims, and no evidence 
of a mounting humanitarian crisis that can mobilize public and political concern. Second, given the 
complexity of autonomous weapons, the case for a ban on their development cannot be stated as a 
simple, catchy message. Third, unlike previous successful weapons ban campaigns such as the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (fronted by Canada), or the campaigns against cluster 
munitions and arms transfers (supported by Norway and the UK respectively), the ICSKR so far lacks 
a willing state sponsor. Fourth, although LAWS share certain features with other weapons that 
transnational civil society has successfully campaigned against in the past (e.g., anti-personal landmines 
that also kill remotely, or blinding lasers which were also targeted “pre-emptively”), powerful voices 
within the humanitarian disarmament community suggest that robotic weapons may actually promote 
humanitarian goals by reducing collateral damage caused by human error, thereby weakening the link 
to existing prohibition norms (Arkin 2015; Kellenberger 2013 and authors interview, April 10, 2016.). 
Finally, at the time the ICSKR launched, two global weapons ban campaigns were already underway; 
the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW) which seeks to limit use of explosive weapons 
in populated areas, and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), implying that 
political attention and activist resources were largely absorbed by ongoing campaign activities. While 
some of these “unfavorable” issue features have also characterized past weapons ban campaigns,3 their 
                                                     
1 https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2013/04/campaign-launch-in-london/ accessed 01-03-2018. 
2 https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/clusterataglance. 
3 E.g., blinding lasers were also targeted by transnational society as an emerging weaspons technology. 
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combination makes killer robots a particularly challenging target, whose selection is not easily explained 
by existing theory. 
So why was the ICSKR launched? Why did leading disarmament NGOs add an issue with seemingly 
unfavorable issue characteristics and low political salience to an already crowded disarmament agenda? 
To answer this question, we turn to theoretical accounts that focus on the structure of inter-organizational 
relationships to explain why some issues rise to the top of the advocacy agenda (Bob 2005; Carpenter 
2007, 2011, 2014; Murdie 2014). But unlike previous accounts that focus on the role of powerful 
“gatekeeper” NGOs, whose central position within transnational issue networks allow them to promote 
or block specific issues at will, we broaden our focus to a wider community of individuals and 
organizations whose competition for professional growth and “issue-control” (Henriksen and Seabrooke 
2016) shape the transnational advocacy agenda in complex and sometimes paradoxical ways. In doing 
so, we draw on recent work in sociology and organizational studies to elaborate and qualify existing 
notions of gatekeeping pioneered by Bob (2005, 2010) and Carpenter (2011, 2014). Highly connected 
and resource-rich NGOs are often less able to directly control agendas than these accounts suggest. 
Instead, porous organizational borders and “revolving doors” imply that advocacy agendas are often 
shaped by individual-level professional networks that develop between organizations. Efforts by 
individuals to steer the agenda towards issues that fit their personal expertise and career ambitions—
rather than wider political context or long-standing organizational commitments to specific issues—are 
a crucial element of transnational agenda-setting. 
Our argument has two levels. The first focuses on dynamics of cooperation and competition between 
organizations that form part of transnational issue-networks; the second on relationships between 
individual professionals within these organizations. At the organizational level, we argue that previous 
investments in task-specific resources prompt NGOs to focus on relatively uniform set of issues which 
fit their existing expertise and established working relationships, thereby introducing a high degree of 
path-dependency in transnational advocacy campaigns—both in terms of what alliances form between 
NGOs, what types of issues are targeted, and what normative frames and advocacy methods are adopted. 
At the individual staff-level we draw on work by Henriksen and Seabrook (2016, 2018) to suggest 
that the porous boundaries of transnational organizations imply that agenda-setting power frequently 
rests with highly-connected experts or “issue-professionals” rather than with advocacy organizations as 
such. These expert individuals are empowered by specialized knowledge and by personal professional 
networks which traverse organizational boundaries and allow them to shape the stances of their 
organizational “hosts” in ways that play to their particular expertise (ibid.; also Goddard 2009). Extant 
scholarship has focused on individual campaigners in their role as “norm entrepreneurs” (e.g. Finnemore 
and Sikkink 1998). We instead focus attention on individuals as career professionals whose expert 
knowledge and high social capital allow them to shape collective agendas. In doing so, we expound the 
organizational processes of target selection identified in previous theoretical accounts of transnational 
advocacy. 
To illustrate our argument, we analyze three “early” transnational disarmament campaigns—the 
campaigns to ban landmines, cluster munitions, and small arms—and three more recent campaigns: the 
International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons, the International Network against Explosive 
Weapons, and the ICSKR. For each campaign, we draw on a combination of different sources of 
information (obtained through hyperlink analysis, web-based content analysis, personal interviews with 
campaigners, and publicly available information about individual career paths) to ascertain to what 
extent issue-selection and campaign membership are influenced by previous campaigns, and/or by 
efforts by individual campaigners to mold the advocacy agenda to fit their specific professional 
expertise. In doing so, we combine standard social network analysis with longitudinal network analysis 
which allows us to observe how transnational networks are configured and reconfigured across time. 
Rather than provide a typical “snapshot graph” of a single campaign network which may reveal merely 
transitory alignments (Vedres and Stark 2010), we thus analyze the transnational disarmament 
community as a broader issue-network that has combined and re-combined in successive campaign 
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coalitions. This temporal dimension allows us to provide a detailed illustration and analysis of the path-
dependent processes that shape the advocacy agenda over time.  
Our analysis explicates several aspects of transnational advocacy campaigns. First is the succession 
of transnational campaign coalitions (TCCs) with similar organizational membership and similar 
normative framings despite wide variation in the issues targeted. Second is the recurrence of a small 
group of issue-professionals who occupy central positions as campaign managers or steering group 
members in successive TCCs. These highly connected individuals move frequently between 
organizations but stay centrally positioned in the wider issue-network thanks to their high social capital. 
This pattern, we argue, is best explained—not by intrinsic features of campaign issues or activists’ strong 
moral commitment to certain issues—but rather by prior investments in professional relationships which 
give rise to highly specialized expertise at both the organizational and individual level. 
Third, our analysis also explicates the timing of TCCs. In contrast to previous research which has 
emphasized growing political salience or “issue-ripeness” to account for the timing of advocacy 
campaigns (Carpenter 2014; Tarrow 1998), we find that timing depends less on when issues are political 
“ripe”, and more (a) on when time and resources are freed up within the transnational disarmament 
community to address new problems, and (b) on competition between NGOs and individual 
professionals to establish issue-control by being first to address new issues. Finally, our analysis 
accounts for what we label “campaign pathologies” – situations in which fierce competition for issue-
control leads NGOs to launch campaigns for which funding, organizational resources and political 
support are critically missing, leading to poor prospects for success and diverting attention from other 
causes. 
The next section defines the central terms of our analysis. The following section presents our 
theoretical argument regarding issue-selection, campaign membership and timing, while the third 
section applies our framework to six global disarmament campaigns. While our empirical focus is on 
disarmament advocacy, our analysis has implications for transnational advocacy more broadly, which 
we discuss in the concluding section. 
Definitions - what are we studying?  
We focus on campaign activities within transnational “issue-networks” (TINs). TINs are similar to the 
transnational advocacy networks (TANs) popularized by Keck and Sikkink (1998, 2) in that they 
comprise “sets of organizations that work, directly or indirectly, on a set of related issues and are 
connected by dense exchanges of information.” As defined by Keck and Sikkink, TANs are “bound by 
shared values” and “often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to 
rationalist understandings of their ‘interests’” (1998, 9). Since we focus on individual and organizational 
incentives that often fit a rationalist understanding of interests, we therefore prefer the more neutral 
concept of a transnational issue-network, which we conceive simply as a network of transnational actors 
that work on a set of related issues (see Carpenter 2011). TINs may include diverse actors such as social 
movement groups, NGOs, governments, international organizations, universities, and private 
corporations. Thus, Carpenter (2011, 73) identifies a “global humanitarian disarmament issue-network” 
consisting of NGOs, specialized UN agencies, and middle-power governments that promote 
disarmament from a humanitarian perspective—that is, with a focus on reducing civilian harms rather 
than protecting national security (Docherty et al. 2018, 1). 
TINs often mobilize around specific transnational campaign coalitions (TCCs), defined as “concerted 
efforts by multiple organizations lobbying for a specific outcome around a certain issue” (Khagram et 
al. 2002, 7). Whereas an issue-network is defined by informal contacts among actors working on similar 
issues, a TCC involves formal ties, centralized mandate articulation and coordinated tactics in pursuit 
of a specific purpose (ibid.) and, as such, have a specific membership and duration. 
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What Shapes Transnational Advocacy Campaigns? 
A wide literature in IR focuses on how NGOs select issues to campaign on. Common to many 
perspectives within this literature is the assumption that, among myriad deserving global causes, certain 
causes are more likely to be picked up than others—due either to their political expediency, or to their 
fit with established norms and practices or with specific organizational interests. While this view does 
not negate an understanding of transnational advocates as motivated by moral impulses, it implies a 
broadly rationalistic and goal-driven approach which conceives of advocates as “principled 
instrumentalists” that simultaneously promote ethical and instrumental goals (Mitchell and Schmitz 
2014; Prakash and Gugerty 2010). 
We focus here on a specific sub-set of “principled instrumentalist” accounts which highlight 
structural relations between advocacy organizations as a key explanatory factor, since these are closest 
to our own view. Such accounts hold that, for any given issue-area in transnational society, some NGOs 
hold disproportionate agenda-setting power due to occupying a central position within a wider issue-
network. In the realm of human rights, Bob (2005, 2010) finds that a small group of “gatekeeper” NGOs 
control the bulk of organizational resources (e.g., staff, funding, political access and credibility) which 
enables them to shape the collective agenda. Carpenter (2011, 2014) finds that humanitarian 
disarmament advocacy is strongly influenced by the decisions of a few powerful NGOs - specifically 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Human Rights Watch (HRW). Once these 
actors commit resources to an issue, she argues, others are likely to jump on board, “creating a 
bandwagoning effect in coalitions once one or two key players join and dampening issue-proliferation 
if they do not” (2011, 76) (for similar views, see Garcia 2015; Stroup and Wong 2017). 
We agree that some NGOs play a larger role in transnational agenda-setting than others. However, 
the gatekeeping power of traditionally powerful NGOs is not as unrivalled as extant studies suggest. 
Rather than a steep hierarchy in which a few “superpower” NGOs control the bulk of resources and 
therefore can determine issue-selection, we argue that the core of the transnational disarmament issue-
network comprises a relatively stable coalition of both small and large NGOs, interwoven by a sub-
network of “issue-professionals” that move relatively fluidly between these organizations. The result is 
a more decentralized agenda-setting process in which collaboration and competition for issue-control at 
both individual and organizational levels determines what issues rise to the top, when.  
Organizational Level: Path-Dependent Coalition Formation 
When explaining the membership of TCCs, our main contention is that history matters. Building 
effective campaign coalitions requires large investments of time and resources to establish formal and 
informal ties between members, to agree joint objectives, and to create a central institution to facilitate 
information exchange and speak on behalf of the coalition. Once paid, these costs are not borne 
continuously but diminish over time, as joint procedures become routinized within individual 
organizations, and as bonds of trust develop across organizations, lowering costs of information-
exchange. Like other types of international institutions, TCCs are therefore less costly to maintain than 
to create (Haddad 2013, 188; Keohane 1984).  
In addition to being cheaper to maintain than to create, TCCs are subject to increasing returns to 
initial investments. Scholars have highlighted a range of benefits from NGO participation in TCCs, 
including increased access to information, economies-of-scale due to sharing and pooling resources, and 
increased visibility and legitimacy as a result of “speaking with one voice” (Yanacopolis 2005). The 
value of such benefits is likely to increase over time, as members converge on shared routines and work 
processes. Again, this creates incentives to keep existing coalitions active rather than disband and build 
new ones from scratch (Haddad 2013, 188). Although specific TCCs may come to an end after a stated 
goal has been achieved, rather than disperse across the wider issue-network, coalition members are likely 
to remain closely connected. When new issues arise, new coalitions are likely to (re)form along similar 
‘Targeting Lethal Weapons’. Issue-adoption and Campaign Structure in Transnational Disarmament Campaigns 
European University Institute 5 
lines to pre-existing ones. Previous ties make campaign formation easier and cheaper, since routines of 
collaboration are already familiar, reducing coordination costs. 
Organizational Level: Path-dependent issue-selection and strategic framing 
To thrive advocacy organizations must periodically select new issues to work on. Here history, in the 
form of accumulated experience and resources, also plays a role. Campaigning for specific issues 
requires NGOs to invest in issue-specific knowledge and expertise, relating, for example (in the case of 
disarmament) to technical standards, UN protocols, international law, military data, and procedural rules 
and customs of relevant diplomatic fora. This technical expertise does not disappear or lose relevance 
with the end of each campaign, but accumulates over time, lowering the cost of participating in new 
campaigns aimed at similar targets. As one TCC winds up and NGOs begin to search for new problems 
to target, they are thus likely look for issues that are similar to ones they have campaigned on in the past, 
and to address those issues in ways that resemble previous strategic frames and tactics, maximizing 
opportunities to draw on existence expertise. 
Whilst we are not the first to argue that NGOs tend to adapt issues and strategic approaches with 
which they have a pre-existing “organizational fit” (e.g. Bob, 2005; Haddad 2013, 188-9), it is important 
to stress that our argument runs counter to several existing explanations. For example, scholars have 
argued that NGOs are likely to select campaign issues that resemble issues already subject to moral 
opprobrium, so that new norms can be “grafted on” to existing ones (Price 1998, 628; Finnemore and 
Sikkink 2005, 897). Others have proposed a learning process whereby a particular strategic approach 
(such as documenting innocent civilian victims) has been found, over time, to be particularly successful 
(e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998). If such explanations were valid, we would expect to observe strong 
similarities in the nature of the successive disarmament problems addressed by TCCs, implying that 
these issues have lent themselves naturally to a “one-fits-all” strategic approach. Conversely, we expect 
NGOs to select campaign issues that allow recycling of previous strategies, independently of these 
issues’ fit with pre-existing norms and practices or their immediate consonance with the wider political 
environment in which the campaigns unfold. 
Organizational Level: Endogenously defined campaign timing 
In addition to deciding what issues to target, an important choice facing transnational advocates is when 
to launch new campaigns. Individual disarmament issues are often worked on by NGOs for decades 
before becoming subject of coordinated campaigns (Carpenter 2014; Garcia 2015). To explain timing, 
scholars have emphasized issue-ripeness—the notion that “the time is right to lobby decision-makers on 
an issue due to its growing political salience” (Carpenter 2014, 67, 110). For example, advocates may 
seize windows of opportunity presented by major policy reports or legislative debates, or by catastrophic 
events such as war (ibid. 461). But while dramatic events have boosted some TCCs (e.g., the use of 
cluster bombs by Israel in the war Lebanon in 2016 provided a poignant focal point for the campaign to 
ban cluster munitions), the broader history of transnational disarmament advocacy provides limited 
support for the notion that political salience is a prerequisite for campaign activation. Carpenter’s path-
breaking analysis of humanitarian disarmament advocacy (2011, 80) showed that, as of 2009, depleted 
uranium weapons, blinding lasers, autonomous weapons, and explosive weapons had zero salience 
within the humanitarian disarmament community. No dramatic events or high level political discussions 
took place to thrust these issues onto the international stage. Nonetheless, within a few years of her 
study, TCCs were launched on all four issues.  
Rather than being governed by exogenous events, we argue that campaign timing is shaped by 
dynamics internal to the disarmament issue-network, including when organizational capacity becomes 
available to target new issues. As one TCC winds up, advocates have their agendas freed to focus on 
new tasks. In considering how to commit resources they are likely to select issues that allow them to 
draw on pre-existing expertise, irrespective of whether these issues appear politically “ripe”. A second 
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determinant of timing arises from incentives to control how issues are framed and who is permitted to 
work on them.4 While NGOs benefit from participating in campaign coalitions that pool resources and 
amplify their voice, preferences often differ over how to frame specific issues, and what forms of 
expertise to draw on (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 10; Stroup and Wong 2017). Once a collective frame is 
chosen, and centralized campaign structures created to articulate common goals, it can be politically and 
financially costly to change tack. Thus, early involvement—as official campaign coordinators or 
members of a steering committee—can be vital in ensuring influence over strategic framing (Lake and 
Wong 2005; Carpenter 2011, 74). As a result, the end of a TCC will often trigger a rush to define and 
launch the next “big issue” as a way to establish issue-control. 
Individual Level: The pivotal role of issue-professionals 
Most scholarship on transnational advocacy networks has taken organizations as the main unit of 
analysis. However, a narrow focus on organizations as actors may overlook the important role of 
individual activists. While some disarmament NGOs specialize on specific weapons systems, many 
organizations work across wider sets of human security and human rights issues. For example, HRW, 
Women’s International League For Peace and Freedom (WILPF), and Amnesty International work not 
only on humanitarian disarmament, but also on women’s and children’s rights, political discrimination, 
and development. In any given campaign, they do not participate with their full organizational apparatus, 
but with only a small segment of professionals within the organization. Thus, while TCCs may comprise 
of hundreds of NGOs that are formally signed up to a campaign goal, their activities and influence are 
often the result of professional collaboration between a small group of advocates that specialize on 
similar issues (Alcade 2014, 237). 
A second reason for focusing on the role of individuals is that the boundaries of NGOs are porous 
(see Henriksen and Seabrooke 2016, 2018). Activists and other professionals may belong to one 
organization, but work more closely with a broader movement or issue-network (DeMars and Dijkzeul 
2015). It is also common for activists to move between organizations, their professional careers being 
defined more strongly by working on specific issues than belonging to a specific organization 
(Henriksen and Seabooke 2016). Thus Alcade (2014, 237) finds that “occasionally, the same individual 
is part of an NGO that lobbies the diplomats, two years later is working for his or her government on 
this issue, and another two years later is representing UNICEF or another UN agency on this topic”. An 
case in point is John Borrie who served as Deputy for Disarmament at New Zealand’s Permanent 
Mission to the UN (1999-2002), then joined the Arms Division of the ICRC before becoming Chief of 
Research at UNIDIR. 
Borrie provides an example of what Henriksen and Seabrooke (2016) label an “issue-professional”—
an individual whose long experience of working on a given issue has endowed him/her with particular 
expertise that is not bound by specific organizations or organizational values. In addition to possessing 
highly specialized skills, issue-professionals are often “multiple insiders” through “shared membership 
or participation in events, organizations, committees, missions, expert groups, etc., through which they 
build their issue-specific personal networks, but also get access to varied organizational contexts” (2016, 
723). This unique “social capital” means they are well placed to orchestrate collective action (Suddaby 
and Viale 2011, 435). Henriksen and Seabrooke highlight how issue-professionals operate across two-
level professional and organizational networks to control how issues are treated (2016, 723). First, they 
note close ties to experts in other organizations allow issue-professionals to act as “brokers”, bringing 
together individual and organizational resources around projects that fit their interests (2016, 18, 2018, 
64; Greenwood and Suddaby 2006, 435; Goddard 2009). Second, issue-professionals may use ties to 
professionals in other organizations to push a specific agenda against competing factions within their 
own organization. For example, an issue-professional working on a specific disarmament issue in an 
                                                     
4 This notion of competition for issue-control draws closely on Henriksen and Seabrooke 2016, 2018. 
‘Targeting Lethal Weapons’. Issue-adoption and Campaign Structure in Transnational Disarmament Campaigns 
European University Institute 7 
NGO that focuses mainly on human rights may wish to switch attention to economic development 
aspects of the issue but meet opposition from human rights experts within the organization. By 
leveraging ties to outside organizations—say, national or UN agencies—s/he may succeed in building 
political support for the issue based on a developmental approach, thereby convincing skeptical 
colleagues to accept a different frame. If facing continued resistance within their own organizations, 
issue-professionals can use their multiple-insider status to move between organizations, selecting the 
most hospitable venue for advancing issues that fit their professional objectives (Henriksen and 
Seabrooke 2016, 16-7; Vedres and Stark 2010).  
We expect the pivotal role of issue-professionals to lead to a narrowing of transnational advocacy 
agendas. While NGOs face incentives to work on related issues across time, theoretically the broad 
portfolios of NGOs such as HRW or WILPF affords considerable flexibility in choosing what issues to 
campaign on according to changing political contexts. By contrast, individual campaigners often invest 
heavily in acquiring specialized knowledge, and in building professional networks around specific 
approaches to a narrower set of issues. As one TCC winds up, rather than investing in new skills and 
building new professional networks, such professionals are likely to search for opportunities to draw on 
pre-existing competences and social ties. As a result of the influence of issue-professionals, we expect 
TCCs to exhibit “small world” characteristics (Watts 1999) insofar as issue-selection and campaign 
membership are strongly influenced by pre-established professional ties at staff-level. 
Cases and Expectations 
We have argued that the membership, strategic framing and timing of TCCs are shaped by instrumental 
incentives internal to the disarmament issue-network (such as organizational growth or individual 
professional career advancement), rather than by exogenous events. The observable implications of our 
argument are three-fold: First, we expect new campaign coalitions to form among NGOs that have 
worked closely together before, rather than (per se) organizations that have a long track-record of 
working on a given issue. Second, when targeting new issues, we expect actors to seek to frame these 
issues in familiar ways in order to capitalize on existing resources and expertise. This implies an element 
of competition among NGOs and individual professionals to control how issues are treated and who is 
permitted to work on them (Henriksen and Seabrooke 2016, 723). Third, we expect the timing of TCCs 
to be dictated by when resources become available within an issue-network to target new problems, 
rather than by when issues are politically “ripe”.  
Our argument has further implications for the micro-level processes driving transnational agenda-
setting. While powerful NGOs often succeed in pushing campaign issues that fit their organizational 
interests (Bob 2005; Carpenter 2011), we expect the ability of centrally-positioned NGOs to “vet” the 
agenda to be constrained in two ways. First, competition for issue-control implies that—regardless of 
where in the issue-network a new idea originates—once a few NGOs begin campaigning on an issue, 
others may feel pressure to get involved to influence strategic framing and campaign organization. Thus, 
rather than less powerful NGOs tirelessly pitching issues to powerful “gatekeepers” who make 
authoritative judgements about whether to accept these issues (Carpenter 2011, 2014; Carpenter et al. 
2014; Stroup and Wong 2017) we suggest that agenda-setting may also occur through a “bottom-up” 
process whereby peripheral actors launch new issues and powerful NGOs jump on the bandwagon for 
fear of ceding issue-control. Second, the high mobility and social capital of issue-professionals who seek 
to advance individual professional goals imply that transnational agendas are often defined by well-
connected individuals rather than by organizations as such. 
To illustrate our argument, we briefly analyse three “first-generation” TCCs (the campaigns to ban 
anti-personal landmines, cluster munitions and the transfer of small arms), before offering a more 
detailed examination of three recent campaigns; ICAN, INEW and ICSKR. These campaigns represent 
the six most prominent global disarmament campaigns over the past 25 years. Their temporal sequencing 
allows us to analyze patters of issue-selection and campaign membership across time. For each 
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campaign, we examine the recurrence of membership at both organizational and individual levels, and 
explore how incentives to reutilize existing resources combined with competition for issue-control have 
influenced target-selection, framing, and campaign-timing.  
Methodology and Data 
We combine standard social network analysis (SNA) and longitudinal analysis to analyze the structures 
of recent disarmament TCCs. SNA has long been used by IR scholars to identify central players within 
transnational networks, and to examine how resources and power are distributed across transnational 
networks (e.g., Lake and Wong 2005). But whereas extant studies have analyzed individual TCCs, or 
compared TCCs pairwise, seeking to relate structural network properties such as centralization and 
density to campaign success (Lake and Wong 2005; Shawki 2010; Hubert 2010; Bower 2016), we focus 
attention on how successive disarmament TCCs intersect due to a roll-over of organizational and 
individual resources from one campaign to the next, and how this influences target-selection and 
campaign timing. 
To measure TCC membership and centrality we use a form of SNA called hyperlink analysis, which 
uses data extracted from page links between organizations’ websites to provide a broad snapshot of 
coalition structures.5 Coalition partners were identified using official partner lists on central campaign 
websites. These organizations’ URLs were then used to construct a dataset of network ties. Through this 
process, we obtained a map of the most linked-to organizational websites within the TCC, by page and 
by site, and gathered detailed information about the presence, strength and quantity of ties between 
actors. This data was then analyzed using UCINET software (Borgatti et al. 2002) to measure the 
centrality, authority, etc., of individual nodes. Next, we followed up this information with interviews 
with representatives from NGOs that received high centrality scores, asking them who they perceived 
as important members of coalitions, at present and in the past (“snowball approach”). This allowed us 
to get a fuller picture of the organizational network over time, as well as to gather information about 
centrally placed individuals. Finally, we combined hyperlink and interview data with content analysis 
of official campaign materials and of individual professionals’ Linked-In and Facebook profiles along 
with information from existing academic studies of specific disarmament campaigns. Our analysis 
triangulates these different sources of data to construct a detailed picture of the transnational 
disarmament issue-network across time. 
Early Campaigns: ICBL, CMC and IANSA 
Transnational disarmament advocacy has a long history, dating back to 19th century. For example, the 
1868 St. Petersburg Declaration which banned exploding bullets was based on the ideas of Henry 
Dunant, social activist and founder of the ICRC. However, the phenomenon of broad TCCs campaigning 
globally to ban specific weapons began with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in 1992. 
The ICBL is widely touted as a symbol of the growing power of global civil society after the cold war 
(Florini 1999, 166). The campaign’s success has been ascribed above all to its success in framing 
landmine use as a humanitarian crisis (rather than an arms control issue) and in formulating a single, 
clear goal: a total ban on the production, stockpiling and use of all landmines (Price 2003; Borrie 2009, 
180; Garcia 2015, 67).  
The foundations for the campaign were laid in 1989 when Raphael McGrath, British expert in 
humanitarian response to conflict, founded the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) to address the human 
suffering caused by landmines in Afghanistan and Cambodia. In 1991, Bobby Muller of the Vietnam 
                                                     
5 Hyperlink analysis is commonly used to analyse transnational networks (e.g. Carpenter 2014; Kleinberg 1999). Its main 
benefit is that provides a method for obtaining detailed data about ties between geographically disparate actors before 
conducting more time-intensive snowball interviews. 
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Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) hired Jody Williams to organize a wider transnational 
campaign, and in October 1992 six NGOs met in New York to form the ICBL Steering Committee. In 
addition to MAG and VVAF, the Committee included Medico International, Handicap International, 
Physicians for Human Rights and HRW (ICBL Timeline 2019). 
Absent from the founding was the ICRC. The ICRC began to single out landmines as a weapon with 
grave humanitarian consequences already in the 1950s. Before 1990, the ICRC published period factual 
reports to demonstrate that “the human and social costs of landmines far outweighed their military 
value” (Garcia 2015; Price 1998, 620). The ICRC’s central leadership, however, were sceptical of an 
outright ban on landmines, calling instead for regulation in the form of self-destruct mechanisms in anti-
personnel mines so they would not endanger civilians post conflict (Borrie 2009, 28). Not until February 
1994 did the ICRC officially endorse the ICBL’s goal of a ban on landmines. Rather than acting as 
“gatekeeper”, this leading authority on landmines thus effectively jumped on the bandwagon once the 
campaign was underway.6 From that point, the ICBL Steering Committee—influenced and aided by the 
ICRC—developed its distinct humanitarian frame, using visual images to highlight the indiscriminate 
suffering caused by landmines, and providing factual data on annual numbers of victims, amputees and 
survivors, along with losses of arable land and the burden on public health systems (Garcia 2015, 67; 
Hubert 2000, xi; Price 2003; Borrie 2009, 180). 
Once the Ottawa treaty banning landmines came into effect in 1999, the landmine coalition did not 
disperse, but instead decided to tackle the related problem of cluster bombs (Haddad 2013, 188). The 
Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC) Steering Group which formed in 2003 as a “sister coalition” to the 
ICBL, comprised of the ICBL Steering Committee plus PAX International. The campaign was later 
joined by other ICBL members, like Amnesty International, Norwegian Peoples Aid,7 International 
Peace Bureau and Action on Armed Violence (AOAV, formerly Landmine Action).  
The ICBL and CMC provide a clear example of how TCCs, once formed, present a low-cost tool for 
further joint advocacy. Mary Wareham, who assisted Jody Williams in coordinating the ICBL recalls 
how, once the ICBL finished, cluster munitions seemed an obvious next target for the coalition as “a 
different weapons with similar problems to landmines” (Authors Interview, May 12, 2017). The 
strategic frame of the CMC closely mirrored that of the ICBL with cluster munitions depicted as a 
mounting humanitarian crisis (Garcia 2015; Bolton and Nash 2010). Whilst the campaign initially 
pressed for a moratorium on cluster bombs, it soon adopted the ICBL’s formula of demanding a 
“complete ban on the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions”.8 For many NGO 
partners this was a departure from earlier strategies. Both ICRC and HRW sought to document the 
human suffering caused by unexploded cluster munitions in the conflict in Kosovo in 1998-99 (Borrie 
2009, 28-9). But while Handicap International suggested a ban on cluster munitions as early as 1998, 
HRW, Landmine Action and MAG initially opposed a ban, calling instead for a moratorium on 
production and sale of cluster munitions (opcit.). HRW argued that it was difficult to push for more 
international humanitarian law rules when existing laws had not been implemented properly by many 
countries using cluster munitions (opcit). Yet, once these groups had developed a collective strategy 
based on presenting landmines as a mounting humanitarian crisis necessitating an urgent ban, it seemed 
logical to also apply this frame to cluster munitions.  
A third campaign launched in 2003 targeting small arms. Both Amnesty International and HRW had 
sought to highlight the devastating effects of small arms in the Rwandan genocide in 1994 to build 
momentum for a global campaign, but found the issue had little traction in the wider issue-network 
where attention was fixed on landmines (Krause 2001, 17). In October 1998, following the signature of 
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the Ottawa Treaty, HRW, Amnesty, British-American Security Information Council (BASIC), GRIP, 
International Alert, Oxfam, Pax Christi and Saferworld founded the International Action Network on 
Small Arms (IANSA).9 Tellingly, many of these NGOs who now emerged as central to the transnational 
disarmament issue-network—including Amnesty, Oxfam and Pax Christi—had not devoted much 
attention to security issues prior to joining the ICBL (Krause 2001, 23). 
Once again, preferences diverged widely over issue-framing. HRW had connected international 
humanitarian law with arms transfers during the landmine campaign and now sought to bring that frame 
to the small arms campaign (Haddad 2013; Stroup and Wong 2017; Waltz 2014). Amnesty and ICRC 
likewise preferred a humanitarian and human rights frame focused on the “indiscriminate” effects of 
small arms use (Kause 2001, 24), while Oxfam and Pax Christi sought to depict small arms as a 
development and governance issue, and GRIP, Saferworld, BASIC and International Alert pushed a 
conflict prevention frame (ibid.). Participants also split on campaign objectives. Amnesty and Oxfam 
both called for strong treaty-based regulation of small arms transfers. However, given strong pushback 
from gun-lobby groups in the United States, HRW officials were wary of the political costs of pursuing 
a prohibition on small arms transfers (Stroup and Wong 2017). To move the project forward Amnesty 
and Oxfam in 2003 created the Control Arms Coalition (CAC) to campaign for an international Arms 
Trade Treaty (Waltz 2014, 160–64). While excluding HRW, members of CAC once again included 
many actors central to the ICBL such as PAX International, Saferworld and WILPF.10 Despite the 
previous reservations of some of these groups, the Small Arms Campaign proceeded to replicate many 
of the humanitarian features of earlier campaigns. Thus a core campaign feature was the “Million Faces” 
petition which brought together people from around the world who had suffered from gun violence to 
share their stories. 
The campaigns on landmines, cluster bombs and small arms illustrate how the membership, strategic 
framing and timing of TCCs are strongly path-dependent. Each campaign included many of the same 
NGOs that had worked together during the ICBL, despite the fact that some of the actors lacked prior 
experience in working on security issues (Figures 1-3, appendix). All three campaigns adopted a similar 
humanitarian framing (Borrie and Caugley 2014). While the analogous framing of the ICBL and CMC 
can be seen as an attempt to “graft” a new norm onto an existing one (Price 2003), this argument is less 
persuasive in regard to small arms which, unlike landmines and cluster munitions, are inherently 
discriminatory in the harm they cause and therefore not as easily linked with norms of civilian protection 
(Hill 2006, 2). In each case, a global campaign seemed timely partly because a coalition already existed 
which had recently completed its mandate—not because dramatic “trigger events” brought the issue to 
the front of public debate. The most plausible trigger event for a campaign against cluster bombs - the 
NATO-led bombing campaign in Kosovo - occurred 5-6 years prior to the launch of the CMC. The 
devastating effects of small arms in the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, which were highlighted by both 
Amnesty and HRW, similarly failed to trigger a wider campaign until active campaigning on landmines 
came to a halt. 
The three campaigns illustrate the cohesiveness of transnational coalitions over time. As Mary 
Wareham, coordinator of the Landmine Monitor Initiative for HRW reflects: 
“So I started with HRW back in 1998 when we’d just got in the Landmine Treaty...And the landmine 
campaign forms the backbone for all of the stuff that we’ve done since then. The Landmine Treaty 
was the flagship you know. And we’ve got longstanding relationships with the NGOs we cooperated 
with in that campaign...” (Authors Interview, 12 May, 2017). 
At the same time, the campaigns illustrate how target-selection and strategic framing are strongly 
influenced by issue-professionals who are often more closely associated with their work on specific 
disarmament problems than with specific organizations. According to John Borrie (2009, 57-8, 123; 
                                                     
9 https://fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/iansa.html. 
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Authors Interview, March 3, 2016) who then worked in the arms unit of the ICRC, three individuals—
Richard Moyes (Director of Policy at Landmine Action and previously working at MAG), Thomas Nash 
(Assistant to New Zealand's Disarmament Ambassador during the ICBL and later coordinator of the 
CMC while working at Mine Action Canada)11 and Raphael McGrath (MAG)—were central to shaping 
the strategy on cluster bombs between 2004-2005, convincing other Steering Committee members, such 
as Steven Goose (Director of the Arms Division at HRW and married to ICBL-Director Jody Williams), 
to adopt a similar frame and objective for cluster bombs as for landmines. Another central player was 
Mary Wareham who assisted Jody Williams in coordinating the ICBL while working for VVAF (1996-
97), and who later worked on the cluster munitions and small arms campaigns while at Oxfam-New 
Zeeland (2006-08) before finally moving to HRW to coordinator the Landmines Monitor Initiative.12 
Common to these individuals is that they have remained committed to advancing a particular 
humanitarian disarmament approach, often moving between organizations to push their agenda. Thanks 
to their central positions in early campaigns coalitions, these individuals have come to play a crucial 
role in defining subsequent campaigns. 
The International Coalition Against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) 
The call for a global campaign against nuclear weapons came from the NGO International Physicians 
for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) in 2006. ICAN officially launched in Vienna in April 2007 
with Felicity Hill, founder of Reaching Critical Will (the disarmament section of WILPF) as campaign 
coordinator.13 At first the campaign did not adopt a humanitarian framing. In the words of Beatrice Fihn, 
Executive Director of ICAN since 2013,14 it “was much more focused on the traditional model of nuclear 
issues” (Authors Interview, Vienna, December 6, 2014). At an early ICAN rally in Melbourne, 2007, 
activists used traditional anti-war slogans such as “Peace Not War.” Archived campaign material on 
ICAN’s original website refers to nuclear weapons “illegal, immoral and genocidal” and highlights the 
unreliability of nuclear deterrence rather than using terms commonly associated with a humanitarian 
disarmament such “indiscriminate harm” and “disproportionate human suffering”.15  
In 2010, however, ICAN was reframed to present nuclear weapons as a humanitarian crisis. The 
campaign launched a “Humanitarian Initiative” to ban nuclear weapons, declaring that the “catastrophic, 
persistent effects of nuclear weapons on our health, societies and the environment must be at the center 
of all public and diplomatic discussions about nuclear disarmament”.16At first sight, this move may seem 
surprising. The success of the humanitarian framing adopted by the ICBL and CMC rested firmly on 
campaigners’ ability to document large daily numbers of civilian victims—a tactic that doesn’t map 
easily onto nuclear weapons.  
However, the move becomes more understandable when considering changes in internal campaign 
structures. The re-framing of nuclear weapons as a humanitarian crisis coincides with the end of active 
campaigning on cluster munitions. According to Thomas Nash, then coordinator of the CMC, until 
August 2010 when the Cluster Munition Convention came into force, CMC members were busy 
pressuring states to ratify the Convention and paid little attention to nuclear weapons (Authors Interview, 
April 6, 2016).17 As the cluster munitions campaign wound down, however, members began to join 
ICAN, importing their previous professional networks and dominant humanitarian frame with them. 
                                                     
11 http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/AK1102/S00082/cluster-bomb-campaign-thanks-thomas-nash.htm. 
12 HRW: “Mary Wareham,” https://www.hrw.org/about/people/mary-wareham accessed 19 March, 2018.  
13 http://www.icanw.org/campaign/campaign-overview/campaign-milestones-2013-2/ 
14 http://www.icanw.org/beatrice-fihn/; https://www.linkedin.com/in/beatrice-fihn-1351bb11/ 
15 ICAN, “Campaign Milestones 2007” accessed 29 Sept. 2018. 
16 http://www.icanw.org/campaign/humanitarian-initiative/ 
17 This is echoed by Mary Wareham, Authors Interview, 12 May, 2017. 
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Nash (2016) describes how a “formal restructuring” of ICAN took place in early 2012 when a new 
Steering Committee was formed and a new campaign director appointed. This Steering Committee 
included many organizations and individuals at the core of the ICBL-CMC, such as Norwegian People’s 
Aid, PAX Christi and the Control Arms Coalition which now began to function as a network node in its 
own right (Carpenter 2011, 85). Also involved was Article36—a new disarmament organization co-
founded in 2011 by Thomas Nash and Richard Moyes--and Zambian Health Workers for Social 
Responsibility, led by Robert Mtonga who previously served on the boards of the ICBL-CMC. These 
actors now began to emphasize the humanitarian costs of nuclear weapons. Campaigners collected 
personal testimonies and medical reports from survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to document harms 
inflicted on innocent civilians, and collected data from health experts about the long term dangers of 
radiation (Garcia 2015, 75).18 This approach closely mirrored tactics used by these groups in previous 
campaigns and secured them a central position within ICAN, as illustrated by Fig.1 (Appendix) which 
shows the network centrality scores of “new” Steering Committee members outstripping those of ICAN 
founders IPPNW and WILPF. 
ICAN’s trajectory confirms our theoretical expectations. The timing of a global campaign against 
nuclear weapons coincided closely with the end of active campaigning on cluster munitions and the 
resulting release of advocacy resources. There is significant overlap with previous campaigns in terms 
of both membership and strategic framing. Finally, as with the CMC, NGOs commonly identified as 
authoritative gatekeepers (HRW and ICRC) did not meaningfully “vet” the campaign. Instead, ICAN 
was launched as a traditional arms control campaign by IPPNW and WILPF, with other NGOs jumping 
on board once the campaign was underway and successfully shifting the focus to a humanitarian based 
discourse that played to their expertise. 
The International Network against Explosive Weapons (INEW) 
INEW was established on 29 March 2011 in Geneva. The Campaign, which counts about 40 NGO 
members is governed by a Steering Committee composed of AOAV, Article36, Center for Civilians in 
Conflict, Handicap International, HRW, Norwegian People’s Aid, Oxfam, PAX, Save the Children and 
WILPF—all organizations closely involved in previous coalitions.19 At the time of writing, the campaign 
is jointly coordinated by Richard Moyes and Laura Boillot on behalf of Article36. Before joining 
Article36, Boillot worked as Campaign Manager (2007-11) and later Director (2011-12) of the CMC, 
and—prior to that—as Program Officer for the Control Arms Campaign. The individuals central to 
running the campaign—Nash, Moyes and Boillot—thus have considerable experience in running 
humanitarian-based disarmament campaigns. 
INEW’s normative frame is familiar. Use of explosive weapons that rely on blast and fragmentation 
to kill and injure is depicted as a humanitarian crisis which causes “broad, substantial and ongoing harm 
to individual and communities” and “furthers suffering by damaging vital infrastructure”.20 To support 
this claim the campaign provides data on numbers of civilians killed and injured in explosive violence.21 
This choice of frame is easy to grasp. Anti-personal landmines and cluster munitions are both a type of 
explosive weapons. As these were recently banned on humanitarian grounds, seeking to prohibit use of 
other explosive weapons in populated areas seemed a logical next step (Moyes and Rappert 2010, 100), 
allowing reutilization of existing tactical knowledge and resources. Less obvious is the timing of the 
campaign. Explosive weapons have featured prominently in military conflicts for decades. The many 
civilian casualties of explosives in the war in Iraq in 2003 heightened political awareness of their 
                                                     
18 http://www.icanw.org/the-facts/catastrophic-harm/ 
19 http://www.inew.org/about-inew/. Accessed 04-09-2019. 
20 http://www.inew.org/unacceptable-harm/. Accessed 04-09-2019. 
21 http://www.inew.org. Accessed 04-09-2019. 
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deleterious effects. The U.N. Secretary General’s Report on the Protection of Civilians (May 2009) 
expressed concern about the “humanitarian impact of explosive weapons, in particular when used in 
densely populated areas”, and urged Member States “to consider this issue further” thus providing a 
potential springboard of a campaign.22 Nevertheless, the issue failed to attract attention within the wider 
humanitarian disarmament issue-network. Thus Carpenter’s 2011 analysis of the “resonance” of 
different weapons systems among NGOs found that explosive weapons had zero salience within the 
issue-network in 2009 (2011, 80). 
As in earlier campaigns, issue-professionals played a crucial role in placing explosive weapons on 
the agenda and framing the issue in humanitarian terms. Moyes began writing on the harms caused to 
vulnerable groups by use of explosive weapons in populated areas in 2009 as Director of Policy at 
AOAV, but found the issue has little traction within his organization. In 2011 Moyes left the AOAV to 
join Thomas Nash in founding Article36—an NGO focused explicitly on humanitarian control of 
weapons technology. The pair now used their social connections and professional skills cultivated on 
the landmine and cluster munition campaigns to build support for a campaign on explosive weapons in 
the wider issue-network (Boillot campaigning manager, Authors Interview, December 20, 2018; 
Carpenter 2014, 115). 
Article36’s leadership of INEW illustrates how issue-professionals can use their “multiple insider” 
status to re-configure organizational resources in ways that advance their specific interests (Greenwood 
and Suddaby 2006). According to Thomas Nash he and Moyes “had been working together on the 
campaign to ban cluster bombs and both decided that we would like to engage with some new areas 
related to disarmament and the protection of civilians. We couldn’t see any existing organisation where 
we would have the flexibility to work on any weapons issue that needed attention, so we set up 
Article36” (Authors Interview, April 6, 2016). Using their close links to specialists in other 
organizations, Nash and Moyes now constructed a powerful professional network around explosive 
weapons, thereby sidestepping formal organizational authority in launched and framing the next big 
disarmament campaign. In line with our expectations, social network analysis (Fig.2) shows strong 
continuity with earlier TCCs despite the fact that many NGOs joining INEW (such as AOAV and HRW) 
had shown little appetite for a campaign on explosive weapons prior to INEW taking off. 
The International Campaign to Stop Killer Robots (ICSKR)  
The International Campaign to Stop Killer Robots was launched in April 2013 by Noel Sharkey and 
Mary Wareham, Director of the Arms Division of HRW.23 Mirroring the ICBL and CMC, the campaign 
calls for an international treaty to ban “the development, production, and use of fully autonomous 
weapons” (HRW 2012, 5). Like previous campaigns, ICSKR adopts a clear humanitarian discourse, 
emphasizing that “lack of human judgement…means LAWS cannot abide by core principles of 
international humanitarian law” and are therefore prone to cause “unacceptable human suffering”.24 
As discussed, the timing and framing of the ICSKR seems puzzling at first sight. No obvious “trigger 
events” occurred prior to 2013 to build momentum for a campaign against LAWS, and the issue had 
low resonance within the humanitarian disarmament issue-network (Carpenter 2011, 80). Indeed, the 
initiative to target LAWS came from outside the issue-network. In 2007, Sharkey, a roboticist at 
Sheffield University with no prior advocacy experience, began to call on states to negotiate a “global 
code of conduct” against the acquisition and deployment of LAWS. In 2009, Sharkey and three fellow 
academics—Jürgen Altmann, Peter Asaro and Robert Sparrow—co-founded the International 
                                                     
22 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 29 May 2009, UN 
Doc. S/2009/277, p.8.  
23 https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2013/04, “Archive April 2013”. Accessed 15-06-2017. 
24 www.stopkillerrobots.org, “About.” Accessed 19-12-2018. 
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Committee on Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) to promote regulation of robotic weapons.25 As predicted 
by Bob’s (2005) gatekeeper model, they first sought buy-in from powerful disarmament NGOs. 
However, Carpenter (2014, 2018) describes how both HRW and ICRC initially declining to target 
LAWS, dismissing the issue as “too science-fiction”. In March 2008, Richard Moyes, then at AOAV, 
expressed an interest in campaigning for a ban on autonomous weapons after the end of the Cluster 
Munition Campaign (Marks 2008), but found little support for the issue within his organization. Thus, 
as of spring 2011, no NGO had autonomous weapons formally on its agenda (Carpenter 2011, 94, 2014, 
1, 101, 201). 
According to Carpenter things changed radically in September 2011, when ICRC President Jakob 
Kellenberger gave a speech in San Remo addressing the international humanitarian law implications of 
LAWS thereby “constituting the issue as a valid concern” for the disarmament community (2014, 2, 
108, 117). And they “changed even more dramatically when HRW published a report the following year 
calling for a ban of LAWS”. Suddenly people “started to get it” (2014, 2). To Carpenter, the launch of 
the ICSKR thus presents a familiar story of a deserving issue that received little global attention until 
powerful gatekeepers decided to promote it.  
Our interpretation differs. Kellenberger’s speech did not single out automated weapons as an urgent 
concern for the global disarmament community. After first addressing cyberwarfare and drones (both 
issues which failed to subsequently reverberate around the issue-network), he noted that “the central 
challenge with automated systems is to ensure that they are indeed capable of the level of discrimination 
required by international humanitarian law”. This, he argued, “will depend entirely on the quality and 
variety of sensors and programming employed within the system” (2011, 812). Kellenberger also 
stressed that “while there is considerable interest and funding for research in this area, such systems 
[LAWS] have not yet been weaponized” before calling on the audience to “also look at their possible 
advantages in contributing to greater humanitarian protection…[by] caus[ing] fewer incidental civilian 
casualties and less incidental civilian damage compared to the use of conventional weapons.” (2011, 
813). In short, Kellenberger’s speech was hardly a call to urgent action on LAWS, and appeared to 
favour regulation over a ban. This leaves the question; why did HRW decide to target LAWS in 2012/13, 
when two other disarmament campaigns were ongoing, and why did they propose to ban weapons not 
yet developed, when other organizations—such as ICRAC and ICRC—called for tighter regulation?  
We suggest that the timing and framing of ICSKR are explained by competition for issue-control 
among NGOs, and by the role played by issue-professionals in assembling the coalition and pushing 
strategies that suited their personal expertise. As explained by Wareham, the issue of LAWS first 
appeared on an internal planning memo at HRW in October 2011 which was “passed around internally 
for about a year with no particular urgency” (Authors Interview, London, May 12, 2017). Then, on 5 
March 2012, Article36 became the first NGO to publicly call for a ban on LAWS.26 Soon thereafter 
HRW moved on the issue, beginning work to document the potentially devastating humanitarian 
consequences of LAWS. On 17 November, representatives from seven NGOs (HRW, Article36, Mines 
Action Canada, PAX, Facing Finance, Peace Movement Aeotearo and Seguridad Humana en 
Latinoamerica y el Caribe) met in New York and agreed to form a coalition. A few days later, on 19 
November, HRW released its report Losing Humanity which introduced a strong humanitarian frame by 
arguing that LAWS are unable to comply with the complex and subjective rules of international 
humanitarian law, which require human judgment (HRW 2012). The report was edited by Steven Goose, 
with extensive comments provided by Jody Williams, now President of the Nobel Women’s Initiative, 
who also coined the term “killer robots” (Authors Interview with Mary Wareham, London, May 12, 
2017). 
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Once agreement was reached on launching a campaign, Wareham describes how individuals in 
HRW’s Arms Division began discussions with representatives of “like-minded NGOs that HRW had 
worked with on cluster munitions” before eventually reaching out to Noel Sharkey, inviting him to join 
the coalition (Authors Interview, May 12, 2017). When ICSKR launched in April 2013, the Steering 
Committee included eight NGOs (HRW, Article36, MAC, PAX, Nobel Women’s Initiative, WILPF, 
Pugwash and ICRAC) seven of which were closely involved in the ICBL (or, in the case of Article36, 
led by individuals who were)27 but several of which had not previously worked on LAWS. 
By taking the lead on campaigning against LAWS, Article36 and HRW succeeded in establishing 
significant issue-control. Rather than calling for regulation of LAWS as suggested by ICRAC and 
indirectly supported by the ICRC, the campaign calls for a pre-emptive ban on the development and 
production. Campaigning for international regulation of LAWS would require activists to engage in 
highly technical debates about degrees of weapon autonomy, robotic programming, and military 
protocol, drawing on the kind of technical knowledge that ICRAC members possessed. By comparison, 
pushing for a pre-emptive ban on the development of LAWS on humanitarian grounds fits closely with 
the long-standing strategies of ICSKR’s early Steering Group members. As Wareham explains about 
the HRW, “We don’t do arms control. Arms control is about controlling weapons. What we do is 
humanitarian disarmament.” (Authors Interview, May 12, 2017).  
To ensure that this frame won out over alternatives, HRW needed to move early to shape the 
campaign discourse. As Wareham recalls about the ICSKR founding meeting in New York, November 
2012 
“…we agreed on the goal of the campaign. We agreed that we...the NGOs sitting around the table, 
would establish a steering committee, a leadership body…and then we would invite other NGOs to 
come on board, to endorse the campaign…” (Authors interview, May 12, 2017). 
ICSKR’s humanitarian framing plays directly to the existing expertise and skill-sets of prominent NGOs 
and issue-professionals in the humanitarian disarmament issue-network. However, a humanitarian frame 
may be a harder sell politically. In the words of Boillot,  
“a lot of the campaigns that we have worked on previously, particularly landmines, but also cluster 
munitions, these have been driven by humanitarian concerns that we could illustrate and show very 
effectively, because a large part of our campaigning was bringing the victims’ perspective into that 
campaigning…And we can’t do that with killer robots because these weapons haven’t been used” 
(Authors Interview, May 31, 2017).  
A further problem arises from lack of state support for humanitarian-based regulation of LAWS. The 
UK, a crucial ally for the Small Arms Treaty, officially opposed a ban on LAWS in April 2015, stating 
that “international humanitarian law already provides sufficient regulation for this area.”28 Norway, an 
important sponsor of previous humanitarian disarmament campaigns, has also stood aside from 
diplomatic discussions on LAWS. Of 28 countries that have called for a ban on LAWS,29 26 are 
associated with the Non-Aligned Movement.30 Many of these states view LAWS, not as a humanitarian 
challenge, but as a problem of global inequality, expressing concern that LAWS will widen the gap in 
military capabilities between technologically advanced and less advanced countries (Informal Expert 
Panel on LAWS, 2016, 4). While a humanitarian frame fits the existing practices of NGOs and 
individuals at the center of the campaign, it thus seems less well matched to political realities. 
                                                     
27 “Our Work: Arms Trade,” PAX, Accessed June 10 2017  
28 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/apr/13/uk-opposes-international-ban-on-developing-killer-robots; France, 
Israel, Russia, and the US have also ruled out negotiating new international law on autonomous weapons. 
29 As of November 22, 2018. https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/KRC_CountryViews22Nov2018.pdf 
30 http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/KRC_CountryViews_16Nov2017.pdf 
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Summary and Conclusions 
Our case studies and social network analysis support our argument that the target selection, campaign 
structure and timing of TCCs are strongly influenced by the trajectory of previous advocacy campaigns. 
First, we found the timing of successive disarmament campaigns to be closely shaped by 
developments within the disarmament community—including when time and resources are freed up 
from previous campaign efforts—rather than by exogenous events. For several of the campaigns 
analyzed, there were no obvious political “trigger events.” Instead, the timing of a new campaign 
coincided closely with the achievement of the stated objective(s) of a previous TCC and a resulting 
slowdown of ongoing campaign activities.  
Second, as summarized Figures 1-4 (see Appendix), we found strong evidence of path-dependent 
coalition building. Although transnational advocacy campaigns often involve hundreds of NGOs, 
successive disarmament TCCs have all featured a similar cast of NGOs as Steering Group members and 
campaign managers. While they share a history of working closely together, these organizations often 
lack strong prior records of working closely on the specific weapon systems in question. Thanks to their 
pre-established professional ties, however, these NGOs consistently receive high network centrality 
scores (see Fig. 1-3, appendix), indicating that prior investments in joint working procedures and strong 
social ties often trump issue-specific technical knowledge when it to comes to assembling and directing 
transnational disarmament campaigns. 
Third, as illustrated in Fig. 5 (appendix), we found that successive TCCs have featured a similar cast 
of “issue-professionals” in central positions. These individuals often move between organizations to 
position themselves centrally in new campaign coalitions. The notion that TCCs are frequently 
orchestrated by individual professionals who use their high expertise and social capital to build 
organizational support for specific issues and strategic approaches was echoed in most of our interviews. 
For example, Anne Feltham, Head of Campaign Against Arms Trade, describes getting involved in the 
ICSKR as a direct result of knowing those at HRW and other organizations who were centrally involved 
in the ICBL (Authors Interview, London, May 12, 2017). The same goes for Daan Kayser who works 
in the Humanitarian Disarmament Division of PAX (Authors Interview, Utrecht, March 2017). Laura 
Boillot also underscored that campaign membership is crucially shaped by existing personal 
relationships:  
“if you know that there’s a good skilled campaigner then you will reach out to them and try and get 
them involved in your issue…I think people learn all of the relevant experience and skill sets from 
doing some weapon-focused humanitarian campaign and so they’re a good fit for working on the 
others” (Authors Interview, June 2, 2017). 
Our case studies suggest that this individual-centered approach to coalition building provides a quick 
and relatively resource efficient way of motivating collective action across the humanitarian 
disarmament issue-network. However, it also has a clear downside insofar as it may result in weak 
organizational buy-in. Thus, several of the NGOs that are represented by high-profiled individuals on 
ICSKR’s Steering Committee are only loosely involved in the campaign at an organizational level. For 
example, WILPF (a founding member of ICSKR’s steering committee and the campaign member 
receiving the highest network centrality score, see Fig.3) demonstrates a strong preference for working 
on nuclear issues.31 Similarly, when asked in 2017 about Article36’s current priorities, Boillot listed 
explosive weapons and a nuclear ban as her organization’s top concerns (Authors Interview, June 2, 
2017). In short, although these NGOs have joined the ICSKR in an official capacity, they are not 
committing many resources to the campaign. 
                                                     
31 Website content analysis (conducted in June 2017) revealed that the top phrases used on WILPF’s Reaching Critical Will 
website were “nuclear ban negotiations” with 228 mentions, “UNGA Nuclear non-proliferation treaty,’ with 280 mentions, 
and ‘abolish nuclear weapons,’ with 28 mentions, while “killer robots” received only 28 mentions. 
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Lastly, we found strong evidence of path-dependency in the strategic framing of disarmament 
campaigns. The specific weapons NGOs have campaigned against since the early 1990s vary widely in 
their technical, military and political features. Nevertheless, a “one-fits-all” campaign strategy has been 
repeatedly chosen, modelled on the humanitarian approach pioneered in the ICBL. This has allowed 
advocates to draw on existing skillsets and professional networks. However, it may have reduced the 
political impact of some campaigns. At an “expert meeting” of humanitarian disarmament professionals 
at Harvard Law School in May 2018, participants highlighted the risk of the humanitarian disarmament 
community applying identical tactics to numerous different issues. Humanitarian disarmament should 
not be a “wind-up” machine, they warned (Docherty et al. 2018, 17). Participants also noted the danger 
that humanitarian disarmament campaigns involve many of the same individuals and organizations who 
often target the same governments and funders, presenting a danger of “campaign fatigue” and 
insufficient funding (ibid.).  
Theoretical Contributions 
Our analysis makes several contributions to scholarly literature on transnational advocacy. To some 
degree our analysis confirms the findings of extant studies of NGO gatekeeping (e.g., Bob 2005; 
Carpenter 2011, 2014) insofar as we find persistent and marked differences in the network centrality of 
different disarmament NGOs, and in their resulting ability to shape the collective agenda. Unlike 
previous studies, however, we do not find a few “superpower” NGOs to be unequivocally in the divers’ 
seat when it comes to shaping the transnational disarmament agenda. Instead, we find agenda-setting to 
be a more complex process involving a wider community of NGOs whose strategic choices have grown 
strongly interconnected through working together across several decades. These NGOs both collaborate 
and compete for issue-control in an effort to capitalize on established resources. This has clear 
implications for the micro-processes of agenda-setting. According to Carpenter (2014, 33), the 
transnational disarmament agenda is “set” by two central players - HRW and ICRC - with other actors 
following closely in their footsteps. In contrast, we find that “bandwagoning” often runs in the opposite 
direction, with powerful organizations like HRW and ICRC adopting a “wait-and-see” approach to new 
issues, opting to launch or join new campaigns only once an issue has already gained substantial traction 
within the wider issue network, so as not to cede issue-control. 
Our argument also advances previous research by highlighting the role of individual campaigners in 
their roles as professional career-makers and organizational brokers, rather than traditional “norm-
entrepreneurs” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, cf. Goddard 2009). Drawing on research in organizational 
sociology (Henriksen and Seabrooke 2016, 2018), we have demonstrated that transnational disarmament 
advocacy is profoundly shaped by a small network of issue-professionals who work across organizations 
to advance individual professional interests. This network is embedded in but partly separate from the 
network of NGOs working on disarmament. While some members of this professional network fit the 
traditional description of “norm-entrepreneurs” (e.g. Raphael McGrath on landmines and cluster bombs, 
and Noel Sharkey on LAWS), individuals at the center of the network tend to be more distinguishable 
by their high social capital and wide organizational access than by their long-term commitment to or 
expert knowledge of particular weapons systems (fig.5 appendix). 
The centrality of issue-professionals within the global disarmament issue-network mirrors findings 
from other areas of transnational activity (Seabrooke and Henriksen 2018). However, the central role of 
issue-professionals may also reflect changes specific to the NGO world. To respond to donor demands, 
many NGOs have grown progressively more institutionalized and professionalized, leading to a growing 
emphasis on hiring professionally trained staff and decreasing reliance on volunteers. This changing 
NGO-model privileges a hierarchical organizational structure (Berkovitch and Gordon 2008, 885), 
leading to a concentration of decision-power at the higher levels of NGO leadership where issue-
professionals typically reside.  
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A last finding regards what we call transnational “campaign pathologies”. As our cases illustrate, 
competition for issue-control can sometimes lead NGOs to “jump the gun” on new issues in an effort to 
control how issues are presented and who is entitled to work on them. This may lead to “premature” 
campaign launch insofar as issues are targeted that are not politically “ripe”, and may result in 
overlapping campaigns within an issue-network with the result that resources are spread thin. As Boillot 
observes in regard to the INEW, ICAN and ICSKR, “three parallel weapons ban campaigns operating 
has caused a scarcity of resources, as limited funding and attention from publics, the media and 
governments are spread between several distinct issues” (Authors Interview, June 2, 2017). This 
observation was echoed by ICSKR coordinator Mary Wareham, who noted that “funding…has just been 
dropping off, and we’re just struggling to make sure that the necessary people are there in those 
organizations to keep this moving forward.” (Authors Interview, May 12, 2017).  
A second “pathology” arises from individual and organizational incentives to push specific strategic 
frames which may imply that issues are targeted and strategies chosen which have low probability of 
political success so long as they advance instrumental goals. Our aim in this article has not been to 
account for the success (or lack thereof) of individual disarmament campaigns. However, by illustrating 
how instrumental incentives at both individual and organizational levels may override political 
expediency, our analysis helps to explain why allegedly instrumental transnational advocates often 
select campaign issues and strategies which lack many of the characteristics identified by previous 
scholarship as essential to campaign success. 
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